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   Professor of Law & Director, Workplace Law Program, University of Denver Sturm College 
of Law; B.A., Rutgers University; J.D. Harvard Law School; L.L.M., Temple Law School. This article 
could not have been written without the support of my colleagues and the workers and organizers of 
Local 2. Among those who deserve thanks are Chris Cameron, Michael Duff, David Harlan, Jack Get-
man, Lisa Jaicks, Karl Klare, Betsy Kuhn, Riddhi Mehta-Neugebauer, Hiroshi Motomura, Gary Peller, 
Paul Secunda, Mike Seidman, Eli Wald, and the Colorado Employment Law Faculty Scholarship Group 
(CELF), including Roberto Corrada, Melissa Hart, Scott Moss, Helen Norton, Raja Raghunath, and 
Nantiya Ruan. Keenan Jones and Kevin Poyner provided valuable research assistance. This introduction 
contains my own impressions of the events surrounding the 2011 AALS Annual Meeting and the con-
current union boycott of the Union Square Hilton. All errors are my own, and I do not purport to speak 
for any other faculty member or union member. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE 2011 LABOR SECTION PROGRAM 
When the Executive Committee of the American Association of Law 
Schools (AALS) Section on Labor Relations and Employment Law (the 
Labor Section)
1
 met in January 2010 to select a topic for our 2011 program, 
we were inspired by two things: the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act)
2
 of 1935 and the imminent pub-
lication of Professor Jack Getman’s monograph, Restoring the Power of 
Unions: It Takes a Movement.
3
 The NLRA, and the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB or Board) it created, have long been favorite targets of 
labor law scholars who cite the anachronisms and biases of the Act and the 
political leanings of the Board as principal contributors to the alarming ero-
sion of union density among the ranks of American workers.
4
 Against this 
background, Getman’s book turns the focus inward to the labor movement 
itself, concentrating on what unions have done and failed to do to mobilize 
and sustain a healthy labor movement notwithstanding the impressive legal 
and practical obstacles to successful organizing and contract negotiations. 
In selecting an “author meets reader” format, the Executive Committee 
hoped to engage Getman’s ideas and the state of the labor movement gen-
erally in the context of the existing scholarly debate over the NLRA and the 
Board. 
A third source of inspiration for the 2011 program soon arose. Within 
days of the Executive Committee’s selection of the 2011 Meeting program 
topic, Local 2 of UNITE HERE
5
 called for a consumer boycott of the San 
                                                          
 1.  The 2010 Executive Committee of the Section included Chair-Elect Ann McGinley (UNLV), 
Secretary/Treasurer Jeffrey Hirsch (Tennessee), Members at-Large D. Aaron Lacy (SMU), Peggie 
Smith (Iowa/Washington University) and Juliet Stumpf (Lewis & Clark), and me serving as Chair.  
 2.  29 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (2006). 
 3.  JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT (2010). 
 4.  See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve 
Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 397, 399-400 (1992) (detailing the decline of unionization in 
the private employment sector since the late 1950s and the erosion of NLRA protections through judi-
cial and legislative action); Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY 
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 224-31 (2005) (acknowledging the overwhelming view that the NLRA, the 
NLRB, and unions are irrelevant and “even un-American” before stressing a return to the NLRA’s orig-
inal values); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1532-44 (2002) (noting that American labor unions have suffered under the NLRA because there have 
been no changes to labor law, Congressionally or jurisprudentially, since the 1950s due to political 
stalemates between pro-union and pro-employer representatives); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Revolution in 
Pragmatist Clothing: Nationalizing Workplace Law, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1025, 1072 (2010) (identifying 
the NLRB’s “blatant politicism” as one of the factors “undermin[ing] the NLRB’s credibility and its 
ability to enforce the NLRA’s goals”); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Impli-
cations of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 621-30 
(2001) (explaining that the NLRA’s provisions on bargaining units, arbitration, secondary boycotts, and 
successorship, as well as its definitions for “employer” and “employee,” are unresponsive to today’s 
workplace). 
 5.  HERE (Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union) and UNITE (Union 
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Francisco Union Square Hilton, the hotel scheduled to serve as the primary 
site for the 2011 AALS Annual Meeting.
6
 When the national leadership of 
the AALS proved unresponsive to the union’s entreaties, a group of inter-
ested law professors, including the leadership of the Labor Section, under-
took to convince AALS to relocate the 2011 Meeting in deference to the 
boycott. Our efforts, which included direct appeals to AALS leadership and 
grassroots mobilization of faculty attendees, became  its own mini-
movement, one that like many of the movements described by Getman and 
his commentators both achieved successes and suffered failures. 
In this Introduction, I offer an overview of the substance and the con-
text of the Labor Section’s program at the 2011 Annual Meeting. Central to 
my reflections is the role that the contemporaneous labor dispute at the Hil-
ton Union Square played as a backdrop to our discussions. The events sur-
rounding UNITE HERE’s boycott provided a foil for Getman’s insights 
and the contributions of the panelists, one that both frustrated and inspired. 
The dispute underscored the difficulties of achieving fair results for work-
ers in an era of globalization and during a time of economic hardship. It al-
so sadly reaffirmed the universality of the basic conflict at the heart of la-
bor/management relations – the tension between those with power and 
voice and those without. Yet, the Hilton dispute also confirmed Getman’s 
optimistic message about the potential for successful labor movements.  It 
demonstrated the power of UNITE HERE’s organizational and bargaining 
strategy – a combination of worker-driven, grassroots action combined 
with broad, public attacks on corporate interests and vulnerabilities –which 
has proved critical to its ability to secure contract victories despite the 
powerful forces aligned against contemporary labor unions. 
Part II of this Introduction reviews Getman’s monograph. Part III lays 
out the events surrounding the Hilton boycott and the ensuing struggle be-
tween committed faculty and AALS leadership over the site of the Annual 
Meeting. From these events, I draw several lessons that resonate with Get-
man’s thesis about the potential for strong labor movements and the need 
for legal reform. Part IV summarizes the symposium contributions and 
concludes. 
                                                                                                                                      
of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees) merged in 2004. UNITE HERE Historical Time-
line, <http://www.unitehere.org/about/history.php> (last visited Dec. 7, 2011); see generally GETMAN, 
supra note 3, at 138-49 (describing reasons for the merger and the subsequent challenges of integrating 
the two unions). Throughout this Introduction, I refer to HERE in discussing pre-merger events and 
UNITE HERE when describing contemporary events including the Hilton boycott that is the subject of 
this piece. 
 6.  The boycott was called for on January 5, 2010. 
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II. WORKER-CENTERED SCHOLARSHIP: GETMAN’S RESTORING THE POWER 
OF UNIONS 
Getman’s Restoring the Power of Unions is a rich work that operates 
on many levels to present an overarching message about the source and po-
tential for union movements. Getman tells the story of the rise of UNITE 
HERE, a counterfactual to the now widespread assumption that the con-
temporary labor movement is dying or defunct. Throughout the book, he 
demonstrates how tenacious and visionary union leaders Vinnie Sirabella 
and his protégé, John Wilhelm, succeeded in expanding membership and 
achieving contract victories through the use of innovative, worker-centered 
campaigns that operate largely independent of the NLRB and traditional 
labor law protections. 
A. The Strategy 
1. A Union of and for Workers 
As Getman explains, UNITE HERE’s success owes principally to its 
commitment to worker agency and voice. Crucial to its organizing strategy 
is the creation of a strong worker-organizing committee, comprised of 
rank-and-file members, that serves as a launching point for all outreach ef-
forts. The beginnings of this technique are apparent in Getman’s rendition 
of HERE’s hard-won campaign to organize Yale’s Clerical and Technical 
workers during the 1980s. Under Wilhelm’s leadership, a handful of paid 
union organizers enlisted, trained, and promoted numerous rank-and-file 
leaders, forming a worker-driven steering committee that could reach thou-
sands of bargaining unit employees dispersed across a large campus.
7
 The-
se workers’ experiences were the heart of the campaign. Union organizers 
encouraged them to speak publically at emotionally-charged union rallies; 
they brought them to witness (and subsequently speak about) Board pro-
ceedings at which Yale opposed the union’s election petition; and they in-
corporated their signatures and personal statements in all of the union’s 
campaign literature.
8
 
UNITE HERE has similarly relied on a worker-centered process in 
approaching collective bargaining. Following its victory among the Yale 
clerical workers, the union obtained feedback from almost two thousand 
employees in developing its bargaining proposal.
9
 As in the organizing 
                                                          
 7.  See GETMAN, supra note 3, at 60-61. 
 8. See id. at 62-64. 
 9.  See id. at 66. 
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process, it deployed workers as spokespersons for the union’s public posi-
tion. Workers, not organizers or union officials, routinely appeared and 
were quoted in media coverage of the ensuing strike.
10
 
This commitment to making workers the initiators as well as the bene-
ficiaries of the union has since become a consistent and integral part of 
UNITE HERE’s organizing and negotiating strategy. In each of the con-
temporary campaigns Getman recounts, a critical step is the mobilization 
and training of rank-and-file workers through the union’s signature worker 
committee. This approach has empowered workers, made the union rele-
vant to their needs, and most importantly, instilled the energy and drive 
necessary to support tough labor contests. 
2. The Comprehensive Campaign 
While HERE has made workers the voice of the union, it has also rec-
ognized the limits workers face in any contest with management. A key in-
sight of the comprehensive campaign strategy is that a withdrawal of ser-
vices at a single worksite is insufficient to persuade large, diversified 
companies to settle favorably with a union, particularly in industries where 
workers can be easily replaced.
11
 Thus, the union has sought to expand the 
contest to multiple fronts within a particular corporation or industry, for in-
stance, by pursuing campaigns against multiple hotels in a particular class 
or chain or against all hotels within a specific city or area.
12
 
At the same time, it has expanded the type of pressure tactics brought 
to bear in pursuit of workers’ interests, reaching beyond traditional weap-
ons like the strike. Drawing on the strategies developed by Jeff Fiedler of 
the Food and Allied Service Trades, it has developed and refined the com-
prehensive corporate campaign. The corporate campaign strategy involves 
extensive research into a corporation’s financial structure and business in-
terests in order to identify non-traditional pressure points, often unrelated to 
the company’s labor relations policy.13 Based on such research, organizers 
and workers have interfered with corporate efforts to obtain funding or oth-
er contracts, reported employer violations of industry regulations, re-
searched and revealed corporate corruption, and threatened to withdraw un-
                                                          
 10.  See id. at 69.  
 11.  See id. at 222 (“It is no longer the case (if it ever was) that strikes can be won at a single facili-
ty by withholding labor and persuading customers and truck drivers to honor a picket line. Powerful 
corporations can almost invariably continue to operate despite the presence of a picket line at one ore 
even several facilities.”). 
 12.  See, e.g., id. at 84-85 (describing the culinary campaign effort to organize all of the major Las 
Vegas hotel/casinos); id. at 131 (describing strategy of coordinating contract termination dates nation-
wide within the hotel industry). 
 13.  See id. at 102. 
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ion pension funds from interested financial institutions.
14
 
However, such research need not lead to the exploitation of corporate 
weaknesses. It can reveal new paths for negotiation or even identify areas 
of mutual interests. Thus, in the strike against Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas, 
workers helped elect a shop steward to the state senate who was able to 
then use her position to pressure the governor to intervene.
15
 In the broader 
Las Vegas culinary campaign, the union was able to offer its political sup-
port to the coalition of casinos in connection with a federal tax initiative 
that was of concern the gaming industry.
16
 Through such tactics, UNITE 
HERE has demonstrated how unions can be powerful business allies as 
well as formidable foes, prompting employers to choose a partnership 
model of labor relations.
17
 
B. The Role of Law and Legal Reform 
What UNITE HERE has not done in formulating its method is refine 
its legal strategies. Over the years, it has eschewed reliance on labor law 
protections and Board procedures. The union favors card check organizing 
and voluntary recognition over the NLRB election process.
18
 It has pre-
ferred the diversified pressure tactics of the corporate campaign to the iso-
lated use of strikes at particular facilities. Throughout the book, the union 
leaders Getman quotes express skepticism about traditional processes and 
techniques, questioning the ability of labor law to level the inherent power 
imbalance that workers face in dealing with management.
19
 
Similarly, Restoring the Power of Unions lets law take a back seat to 
the real-life dynamics of making movements work. Yet the call for legal 
reform is by no means absent from the book. Getman calls for various 
changes in the law, from reforming the Board’s election process to 
strengthening the strike weapon.
20
 Importantly, however, Getman’s purpose 
in advocating reform is not to deliver any easy wins to unions but to enable 
the organic development of strong and sustainable labor movements. 
For this reason, Getman’s suggestions differ in key respects from 
those of many scholars. Most notably, Getman offers only tepid support for 
                                                          
 14.  See id. at 82 (quoting Fiedler’s 1984 paper presentation on the advantages of such tactics over 
the traditional election process). 
 15.  See id. at 87-88. 
 16.  See id. at 85. 
 17.  See id. at 86-87, 103-04. 
 18.  See id. at 109-11. 
 19.  See, e.g., id. at 83 (quoting FAST lawyer Richard McCracken stating that he would “never file 
another NLRB election petition, because [he] was convinced you couldn’t organize through the 
NLRB”). 
 20.  See id. at 268-74. 
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the proposed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), the much heralded and 
highly controversial legislation that would endorse card check organizing.
21
 
He also rejects the idea that employers’ response to union election cam-
paigns will necessarily intimidate voters.
22
 Getman prefers granting equal 
access rights to union organizers over bolstering card check procedures or 
regulating employer speech.
23
 His argument is testament to the faith he 
places in both unions and workers. Good organizers can counteract em-
ployer propaganda; but they must have an opportunity to deliver their mes-
sage. 
In the same vein, Getman’s proposed reforms to the rules of engage-
ment in economic contests focus on permitting and sustaining broad soli-
darity among workers as well as across other interest groups. His most 
mainstream suggestion – overturning management’s right to permanently 
replace strikers – is not merely a thumb on the scale for workers in the 
moment of conflict, but a means of ensuring solidarity over the course of a 
collective bargaining relationship. Drawing on the infamous International 
Paper strike in Jay, Maine, he describes how management’s ability to retain 
strike breakers devastated both the union workers and the larger communi-
ty. Even after the strike ended, hostility continued as returning strikers were 
forced to work side by side with the replacements who had permanently as-
sumed the jobs of their striking colleagues.
24
 
                                                          
 21.  See id. at 261-67. EFCA was last introduced in the 111th Congress. H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. 
(2009); S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009). For articles discussing its provisions and significance for labor, see 
generally Henry H. Drummonds, Beyond the Employee Free Choice Act: Unleashing the States in La-
bor-Relations Management Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 98-113, 143 (supporting the 
passage of the EFCA but calling for more expansive reform to labor relations policy, including experi-
mentation at the state and local level); William B. Gould IV, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, 
Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations 
Law in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 311-14, 324-28, 344-45 (2008) (expressing support for 
EFCA’s union recognition and arbitration provisions but suggesting that a supermajority of authentica-
tion cards be required to circumvent a secret-ballot vote); Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck: Privileg-
ing “Employer Free Choice” over Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. REV. 
329, 336-38 (2008) (expressing approval for EFCA as means of providing workers a more democratic 
path to selecting a bargaining representative that avoids the coercion often associated with secret-ballot 
Board-run elections); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the 
Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655, 656-64, 712-27 (2010) (acknowledging that EFCA 
provisions “constitute an improvement over the status quo” but offering alternatives to better address 
managerial intervention in union organization); Paul M. Secunda, The Contemporary “Fist Inside the 
Velvet Glove”: Employer Captive Audience Meetings Under the NLRA, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 385, 
399-403 (2010) (asserting that free-choice is a “central animating principle” of labor relations statutes 
and that EFCA carries forward the sentiments originating in the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts). But see 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT (2009) (suggesting that 
EFCA eliminates employees’ free choice by allowing unions to coerce employees); Harry G. 
Hutchinson, Employee “Free” Choice in the Mirror of Liberty, Fairness, and Social Welfare, 60 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 575, 575-613 (2011) (same). 
 22.  See GETMAN, supra note 3, at 204-11. 
 23.  See id. at 211. 
 24. See id. at 226-27. 
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But if unions are unlikely to succeed using traditional strikes alone, 
than it is not enough to change the rules regarding replacement workers. 
Rather, the law must evolve to protect all aspects of the comprehensive 
campaign. As Getman points out, many of the techniques deployed by un-
ions are of questionable legal status. Workers engaged in job actions that 
fall short of a full work stoppage need fear that their conduct will be 
deemed an unprotected partial strike.
25
 Unions seeking to build solidarity 
with consumers and other allies have to navigate complex rules that prohib-
it so-called secondary boycotts, subject to special exceptions.
26
 If unions 
are to stand a fair chance against national and multi-national companies, 
the law must protect their ability to engage in creative protests and reach 
across lines that have traditionally separated companies, their suppliers, and 
end users. 
In sum, while UNITE HERE has not relied heavily on law, the ability 
to sustain and replicate its approach may well depend on legal reform. 
Rules based on an antiquated model of economic warfare must give way in 
recognition of the new dynamics in which both unions and companies op-
erate. 
III. LIFE IMITATES LAW: THE HILTON BOYCOTT 
Noteworthy in Restoring the Power of Unions is the book’s narrative 
approach, which echoes Getman’s message about worker-centered union-
ism. According to Getman, UNITE HERE has succeeded by consistently 
making workers the spokespeople of the union and looking to the rank-and-
file as a source of future leaders and organizers. Not coincidentally, Get-
man’s book follows this tradition, using the voices of the workers and or-
ganizers who played a role in critical campaigns to tell the story of UNITE 
HERE’s rebirth. Getman tells us that a union succeeds by putting the voices 
of its constituents first; his book succeeds for the same reason. 
In that tradition, I too turn to narrative. In the section that follows, I 
offer a story about how a group of activist law professors mobilized in an 
attempt to convince the AALS to honor UNITE HERE’s consumer boycott 
of the Hilton Union Square in San Francisco. It is a story I tell modestly, 
focusing as it does on one narrow sliver of the union’s long-standing cam-
paign against the Hilton and other San Francisco hotels. It is also an aberra-
tional story, one involving the organization of highly privileged law faculty 
rather than the service sector workers UNITE HERE represents.  Even so, 
it is a story that analogizes to the types Getman tells about the successes 
                                                          
 25.  See id. at 226-27. 
 26.  See id. at 232-35. 
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and failures of various organizing efforts and the power of labor move-
ments to change the lives of workers. At the same time, it throws into relief 
the far more enduring challenges faced by rank-and-file workers in build-
ing the type of movement that Getman describes. 
A. Law Professors in Support of the Hilton Workers: The AALS Campaign 
The San Francisco hotel industry is no stranger to labor unrest, and 
neither is the AALS. Conferences predating the 2011 Meeting were marred 
by conflict prompting protest by law school faculty and, in some instances, 
responsive action by the AALS. In fall 2004, a strike and subsequent lock-
out at the Hilton and several other hotels prompted the AALS to develop a 
plan to relocate some of the 2005 Annual Meeting to another venue in the 
event the standoff continued.
27
 In 2006, the AALS, having seemingly 
learned from the events of 2004-05, made the decision to relocate the 2007 
meeting from San Francisco to Washington D.C. in the face of continued 
labor strife, concluding that there was “a reasonable possibility that the cur-
rent boycott could result in a strike during the time of the AALS Annual 
Meeting.”28 
Even so, the AALS leadership proved unprepared, or perhaps unwill-
ing, to deal with the events that unfolded in the lead up to the January 2011 
Annual Meeting. That dispute ultimately culminated in an organized facul-
ty-led effort, first to persuade the AALS to relocate the Annual Meeting, 
then to encourage individual faculty sections to move their programs out of 
the Hilton and refuse to participate in events taking place there. While the 
former effort was not successful, the latter was. The AALS was at times 
non-responsive to appeals of the faculty boycott supporters; at times it was 
outwardly resistant. In contrast, the support of individual faculty members 
was overwhelming. As a result of the grassroots efforts of the faculty boy-
cott supporters, over ninety percent of the Annual Meeting sessions re-
quested relocation out of the Hilton in support of the boycott, and several 
speakers whose sessions were not relocated by the AALS cancelled their 
appearances. 
                                                          
 27.  This so-called “Plan B,” however, was never launched, The parties agreed to a city-wide 
“cooling off period” at the urging of San Francisco’s mayor, which ended the strike and lockout.  In 
light of this, the AALS unilaterally decided to restore relocated events to the Hilton. However, the cool-
ing off period did not settle the underlying dispute or end the union’s calls for a consumer boycott of the 
targeted hotels.  When the AALS proved unwilling to go forward with the relocation plan in support of 
the boycott,  –the Labor Section chose to independently relocate its program to the University of San 
Francisco Law School.  
 28.  Memorandum from Carl Monk, Executive Director, AALS to Deans, Faculty and Staff of 
Member and Fee Paid Schools (May 3, 2006), available at <http://www.aals.org/deansmemos/06-
12.html>. 
RRICHMAN_JCI.DOCX 1/24/2012  11:57 AM 
452 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT POLICY JOURNAL [Vol. 15:443 
1. The Underlying Dispute 
The dispute between Local 2 and the Hilton was in many ways typical 
of contemporary labor contests. The union’s previous collective bargaining 
agreement expired in August 2009 and subsequent negotiations were un-
successful. Blackstone Group, the private equity firm that owns the hotel, 
appeared to be thriving financially notwithstanding the economic reces-
sion.
29
 Yet it pursued a strategy of demanding deep concessions from its 
workforce. Particularly upsetting to workers was a proposed increase in 
employee health care contributions that the union estimated would cost 
workers an additional $200 per month and a change in housekeepers’ work-
load from fourteen to twenty rooms per day, a forty percent increase in 
work volume.
30
 In addition to opposing these demands, the union sought 
modest increases in wages and pension contributions. Like most contempo-
rary contract renegotiations, however, the union’s position was largely one 
of defending current standards rather than seeking significantly improved 
terms of employment. From the perspective of the workers, the fight was 
about the ability to earn a decent living and support their families by work-
ing an honest and safe job.
31
 
The approach of the union was illustrative of the comprehensive cam-
paign strategy documented by Getman and reflective of the realities of the 
current economy. The Hilton dispute was not an isolated contest, but the 
union’s first target in a major effort to renegotiate contracts with compara-
                                                          
 29.  For news articles reporting on Blackstone’s growth strategy and financial health during the 
relevant period, see generally Rick Carew, International Finance – Blackstone Opens in Shanghai, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2009, at B6 (reporting on Blackstone’s expansion into China’s private-equity 
market); Kris Hudson, Corporate News: Blackstone to Join General Growth Investors, WALL ST. J., 
May 22, 2010, at B5 (describing how Blackstone contributed $500 million to a $6.5 billion proposal to 
buy General Growth Properties Inc., the second-largest U.S. mall owner, when the company exited 
bankruptcy); Matthew Karnitschnig, Blackstone’s Hedge; Buyout Firm Fights a Slump, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 11, 2008, at C3 (reporting that Blackstone, in response to the credit crisis, expanded into areas re-
sistant to such downturns); Lingling Wei, Global Finance: Blackstone Reworks $7 Billion in Debt – 
Deal Is Struck to Restructure Cash Owed on Purchase of Sam Zell’s Equity Office Properties Trust, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2010, at C3 (describing how Blackstone restructured debt from property buy-out 
deals, including Hilton Hotels, to prevent money-loss despite the hurting real-estate market); Gregory 
Zuckerman, Global Finance: Blackstone Raises Fund of $15 Billion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2010, at C3 
(reporting that Blackstone had finalized “the largest fund for buyout deals since the financial crisis 
erupted and one of the largest on record”). 
 30.  See Carl Finamore, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly in SF Hotel Dispute, BEYONDCHRON 
(Jan. 10, 2011), <http://beyondchron.org/news/index.php?itemid=8796;>; UNITE HERE Local 2, Boy-
cott the Hilton Hotel Union Square (undated) (on file with author). 
 31.  As AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka described the dispute at the January 5, 2010 rally that 
kicked off the boycott, “‘It’s about the struggle of all working women and men in our country . . . to 
hold onto our rightful share of the American dream.’” Marilyn Bechtel, Hotel Workers Sit in, Proclaim 
San Francisco Hilton Boycott, PEOPLE’S WORLD (Jan. 7, 2010), <http://www.peoplesworld.org/hotel-
workers-sit-in-proclaim-san-francisco-hilton-boycott/>; see also Workers at San Francisco’s Largest 
Hotel Begin 6-Day Strike, OAKLAND TRIB., Oct. 13, 2010 (“The union alleges that proposals by hotel 
management would ‘lock workers into permanent recessionary contracts.’”). 
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ble hotels city-wide.
32
 In pursuing the Hilton, the union chose to conduct a 
consumer-oriented campaign that aimed to interfere with customer use ra-
ther than the hotel’s ability to provide services. Rather than calling for an 
all out strike, it conducted intermittent protests, picketing, and job actions 
that enhanced the public visibility of the workers’ position.33 These actions 
culminated in a full-scale consumer boycott approved by a worker vote. In 
January 2010, workers and their supporters staged an 800-person march 
through downtown San Francisco to announce the boycott, ending in a sit-
in in the Hilton Union Square entry plaza.
34
 
The focus of the campaign was obtaining the support of individual and 
corporate customers. Through letters and delegations the union sought to 
inform potential hotel users of the labor dispute and to secure a commit-
ment to honor the union boycott. These were successful in many instances. 
The day the boycott was announced, the Instituto Laboral de la Raza, an 
advocacy group supporting low-wage workers, announced that it would 
move its annual awards banquet to another event venue, removing approx-
imately $100,000 in business.
35
 Such showings of solidarity were not lim-
ited to natural allies like Laboral. In October, the American Political Sci-
ence Association, an organization of academics and political science 
professionals publically withdrew its 2011 Annual Meeting from the Hil-
ton, relocating the event to Seattle.
36
 The Southwest Center for Human Re-
lations Study similarly relocated its 2011 Conference on Race and Ethnici-
ty, a 2000-person event, opting for another San Francisco hotel.
37
 Over the 
course of the campaign, the union secured pledges from numerous neutral 
organizations and individuals to endorse, not only its boycott of the Hilton 
                                                          
 32.  The dispute involved sixty-one other San Francisco hotels employing 9000 hotel workers, 
with each hotel negotiating with the union individually. The San Francisco campaign was also coordi-
nated with hotel contract negotiations occurring in other major cities. See Tom Abate, 3-Day Strike 
Ends at Hyatt Regency, S.F. CHRON., June 12, 2010, at D1 (describing union’s multi-hotel and multi-
city strategy). 
 33.  See Workers at San Francisco’s Largest Hotel Begin 6-Day Strike, supra note 31 (6-day Hil-
ton strike in October 2010); Bechtel, supra note 31 (boycott announcement and sit-in at Hilton en-
trance); Sarah Duxbury, Hilton Workers to Strike Next Week, S.F. BUS. TIMES (last modified Oct. 16, 
2010, 12:16 AM PDT), <http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2010/09/hotel_union_ 
plans_hilton_strike_for_next_week.html > (public boycotts, strike vote and “aggressive letter-writing 
campaign” directed at San Francisco hotels during 2010). 
 34.  Bechtel, supra note 31. 
 35.  See Carl Finamore, The San Francisco Hotel Dispute, COUNTERPUNCH (Jan. 6, 2011), 
<http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/01/06/the-san-francisco-hotel-dispute/>; Instituto Laboral de la 
Raza 2010 Labor Awards “Save the Date Card,” available at <http://www.ilaboral.org/ 
2010Awards/images/2010images/ILR-2010-AWARDS-SaveTheDateCard-2sides.pdf> (announcing 
change in location “[i]n solidarity with UNITE HERE Local 2 hotel workers”).  
 36.  See Letter from Carole Pateman, President, Am. Pol. Science Ass’n, 2011 APSA Annual 
Meeting Location Change (Nov. 23, 2010), available at <http://www.apsanet.org/content_73505.cfm>. 
 37.  See Press Release, Nat’l Conference on Race and Ethnicity, Hotels for the National Confer-
ence on Race and Ethnicity (ENCORE®) Announced (Feb. 16, 2011) (on file with author). 
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but any boycott conducted in furtherance of the workers’ city-wide cam-
paign.
38
 
2. The AALS Decision and Faculty Request for Reconsideration 
The AALS was not among these supporters. During the late summer 
and early fall, members of Local 2, supported by individual law professors 
and other interested organizations engaged in a letter writing campaign in 
an attempt to convince the AALS to honor the boycott. In early August, the 
union sent an e-mail request to the AALS, asking for its support and offer-
ing assistance in relocating the Meeting.
39
 This was followed by a letter 
from the Society for American Law Teachers (SALT), emphasizing the 
importance of the AALS’s decision in providing leverage to the workers 
and requesting the AALS to communicate with attendees about the ongoing 
dispute and the risk of disruption by worker concerted activity.
40
 
The AALS did not respond directly to these appeals. Rather, on Sep-
tember 27, the AALS announced its decision not to relocate or cancel the 
2011 Meeting.
41
 Presenting its conclusion as “the best among . . . bad 
choices,” the AALS cited respect for its contractual commitment with the 
Hilton as well as the logistical impediments to relocation. The AALS did 
not meet or speak with any of the constituencies who had proposed reloca-
tion in advance of its decision. It did, however, state that it would allow a 
subset of AALS sections to request relocation of their individual programs 
to another hotel through a soon-to-be-articulated process.
42
 
To a number of law professors, this conclusion and the support cited 
were unconvincing. In October, a group of deans and other legal academ-
ics, spearheaded by Professors Karl Klare, Gary Peller, and Mike Seidman, 
called on the AALS to reconsider its decision.
43
 This “Joint Request for 
                                                          
 38.  See Contract Fight Boycott Endorsers (undated) (on file with author). A list of past and current 
boycott endorsers is available at Local 2’s website. See Our Supporters, ONE DAY LONGER SF, 
<http://www.onedaylongersf.org/?cat=9> (last viewed Dec. 9, 2011). 
 39.  See E-mail from Riddhi Mehta-Neugebauer, Local 2, to H. Reese Hansen, President, AALS 
(Aug. 2, 2010, 12:03 PM) (on file with author). 
 40.  See Letter from Raquel Aldana & Steven Bender, SALT Co-Presidents, to Susan Westerberg 
Prager, Executive Director and CEO, AALS (Sept. 1, 2010), available at <http:// 
www.saltlaw.org/userfiles/file/9-1-10Pragerboycott.pdf>.  
 41.  See Letter from H. Reese Hansen, President, AALS et al., to Faculty and Staff, Important 
Message Concerning the 2011AALS Annual Meeting (September 27, 2010) [hereinafter September 27 
Letter], available at <http://www.aals.org/am2011/AM&SFLaborDisputeMemo.pdf>. 
 42.  Id. at 3. The letter stated that programs would be moved to the Hotel Nikko, one of the three 
conference hotels. The Nikko was not at the time subject to a labor dispute; however it was and contin-
ues to be non-unionized. Thus, as the AALS acknowledged, for many faculty committed to supporting 
the union, this was not an acceptable relocation site. 
 43.  Letter from Mark Tushnet, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School et al., to AALS Executive 
Committee (undated) [hereinafter the Joint Request], available at <https://6119995265659744581-a- 
1802744773732722657-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/lawprofsforhiltonworkers/home/documents/Law 
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Reconsideration” questioned both the substance of the AALS’s conclusion 
and the anti-democratic nature of the organization’s decision-making pro-
cess, calling on the AALS to delay final decision about relocation and en-
gage in a debate with member schools and their faculty.
44
 Shortly after, a 
group of individual faculty members sent a second letter to AALS, appeal-
ing to both principle and pragmatics.
45
 Citing the special role of law facul-
ty, this “Open Letter” urged the AALS not only to honor the personal con-
victions of individual faculty members but to appreciate the symbolic 
significance of legal educators acting in concert with workers: 
In our view it is part of a law professor’s job … to model for students a 
commitment to principle even when that is inconvenient or inexpedient. 
Many of us will understand that responsibility to include honoring the 
workers’ boycott in this situation. 
 [W]e also aspire that our professional association be one embodying 
respect for the legitimate and legal organizing efforts of disempowered 
people. [I]t is important to many law teachers that their professional as-
sociation not effectively side with the Blackstone Group by rendering 
nugatory one of these workers’ few economic weapons – the willingness 
of customers to stop doing business there until the labor conflict is re-
solved.
46
 
The Open Letter went on to point out the costs of remaining at the Hil-
ton
47
 and questioned the AALS’s assertion that its relocation options were 
limited.
48
 The letter also took issue with the AALS’s invocation of its con-
tractual commitments, contesting the premise that contractual obligation 
                                                                                                                                      
%20Professor%20Joint%20Consideration%20Request%20to%20AALS%20Oct%2012%202010.pdf? 
attachauth=ANoY7coXs_HZ1h4_Nl5hCIKpuEWEsuajotFzU6FNWDksSE_kVTfer4g11ZtUyqfCD5Y 
1rxt_gZXj7OwSMbCcS7MHrhhn9MhUQtyj00f_joLFrlCC9oMQQ_ufNZopbqbNyC_NULPefRJmw 
hmIcdeX66jbE5JEO9k1Qj8EbA9XQWanoHokvLWYoo2-LD-eSd4XSW66JXGjVTdw5r2XCXrOK 
PauVE10IbZiiqRIANjEJNUYAvJPcyYyU7bKX7aHTdDhGCe4VxAmVahtbAwAr6SDTS0UpUgdeS 
5Y8vbBd1UUnRsRkCOJp9lPZ1fY8mNGn6lXEuSVl9yRM5Ph&attredirects=0>. 
 44. Id. 
 45.  See Letter from Katherine Stone, Professor of Law, UCLA Law School et al., Open Letter in 
Support of Request for Reconsideration of the AALS’ Decision to Convene Annual Meeting at the Hil-
ton Hotel in San Francisco (undated) [hereinafter Open Letter], available at <https://6119995265659
744581-a-1802744773732722657-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/lawprofsforhiltonworkers/home/
documents/Law%20Professor%20Open%20Letter%20to%20AALS%20Executive%20Committee % 20
Seeking%20Reconsideration%20of%20the%20Hilton%20Decision.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cpjN5Y1
VZUbB2xT7iZJUkuFrYAT1iEv15vo1wtNrqEXC3EafgtOXbiVUyOxr7L50pH4R-pTbYen1taf8JzqMk
W7zc6NssVJCaXY2IUzfMVgh-vs0X7AWG7Jr20F3LxvvvX0pW3RYMQl0lLHZ81ovaPj1sjvEy
KrR54f-B-mGcldVSRYbJofaYFIihW7yEQhFAsyXvxj0WraZI5bC03RF5k2fQymY67WZ6Yseett_R-2
2Q8OUKe9XMbY8SMBlRZChnttmfkESh_jvswv3eM95MaCinTdE6Ih7xsJIucLx1NhRRi8kjiKT_TD
E8ySDSy6tS5j0wzHkOiDyMpYIRyABK-n3XwbCMUkfxpSj4JkLkncTYQbE%3D&attredirects=0>. 
Some of the same faculty signed both the Joint Request and the Open Letter. 
 46.  Id. at 2. 
 47.  Id. at 3-4 (suggesting that the AALS had given insufficient consideration to the potential for a 
downturn in attendance, distraction from the business of the meeting, and disruptions by protests and 
other job actions). 
 48.  Id. at 4, app. 5 (providing a list of possible alternative venues). 
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should be placed above other ideological commitments and questioning 
whether the AALS would in fact incur liability in moving the Meeting.
49
 
On October 19 the AALS issued an “update” on its efforts to deal with 
the ongoing labor dispute.
50
 It did not address the arguments raised by the 
Joint Request and Open Letter with respect to its decision not to relocate, 
but described additional measures it had determined to take in order to ac-
commodate those with “strong personal feelings” about the dispute.51 These 
included agreeing to make available a third hotel, Wyndham Parc 55, capa-
ble of accommodating more programs.
52
 The AALS did not respond to the 
suggestion in the Joint Request that it convene a dialogue with interested 
faculty, although it offered “thank[s to those who had] written to the AALS 
to express [their] views.”53 
3. The Alternate Location Process and Grassroots Faculty Action 
Following transmission of the Open Letter seeking full-scale reloca-
tion, efforts to support the boycott shifted away from the AALS’s decision 
to remain at the Hilton and toward the AALS’s announced process for relo-
cating individual section programs. At this juncture, two groups of faculty 
committed to honoring the boycott came together to work in a strategic 
fashion, supported by and in concert with the Local 2 workers and organiz-
ers. 
During September 2010, when Karl Klare, Gary Peller, and Mike 
Seidman were orchestrating the appeal to the AALS to relocate the Annual 
Meeting as a whole, I was working with the Executive Committee of the 
                                                          
 49.  Id. at 4-6. The Open Letter observed that an assessment of possible contractual liability de-
pended on the precise language of the contract, including the existence of any liquidated damages or 
force majeure clauses. The letter noted the absence of any reference to such provisions in the AALS’s 
defense of its relocation decision. Indeed, the AALS’s silence about the precise terms of its contract 
ultimately proved telling. Several months later at the Annual House of Representatives Meeting, the 
2011AALS President intimated that the AALS had in fact included in its contract with the Hilton a 
clause permitting cancellation in the case of unforeseen events. See infra notes 92, 4 and accompanying 
text. 
 50.  E-mail from H. Reese Hansen, President, AALS et al., to Law School Faculty and Profession-
al Staff, An Update Concerning the 2011AALS Annual Meeting & the Hotel Labor Dispute (Oct. 19, 
2010, 5:43 PM) [hereinafter October 19 Update] (on file with author). 
 51.  September 27 Letter, supra note 41, at 2. 
 52.  The letter explained that the AALS was adding the Parc 55 as an alternate site, having recently 
received assurances that there would be no active labor dispute at this hotel during the time period of 
the 2011 Annual Meeting Id. Throughout the Hilton Boycott, the Parc 55 was on Local 2’s “risk of dis-
pute” list because its workers, like those at the Hilton, were without a contract. However, the Parc 55 
was not subject to a boycott or the site of any job actions during the time period relevant to the AALS 
Annual Meeting. Had AALS responded to the workers and union representatives that sought to contact 
them about the boycott, it would have learned this earlier. 
 53.  October 19 Update, supra note 50, at 2. 
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Labor Section and the leaders of the other employment law sections
54
 to in-
dependently relocate our individual panel programs.
55
 This appeared to be 
our safest option, as the AALS had not yet articulated its position regarding 
the boycott and resolution of the underlying dispute appeared unlikely.
56
 
In early October, however, the AALS sent an e-mail to all section 
leaders communicating its decision not to move the Annual Meeting from 
the Hilton and detailing the section relocation process it announced in its 
September 27 letter to the wider community.
57
 As a result, the leaders of 
the employment law sections made the decision, albeit with some reserva-
tions, to engage the AALS’s designated process as a first choice rather than 
seek a separate host location for our events. Among those reservations was 
a concern that acquiescing in the AALS process would effectively sanction 
the organization’s underlying decision not to relocate the larger conference 
and force us to both associate with and underwrite the proceedings remain-
ing at the Hilton.
58  
In wrestling with these issues, the section leaders de-
termined that rather than simply put in our own requests for relocation, we 
would take the further step of affirmatively encouraging other sections to 
avail themselves of that option as well. The goal was to get as many sec-
tions to request an accommodation as possible to signal to the AALS the 
strength and breadth of faculty commitment to supporting the boycott. 
On October 15, I sent an e-mail to all section chairs and chairs-elect 
advising them of the labor dispute and the AALS’s relocation process.59 I 
                                                          
 54.  These included Tristin Green (San Francisco), Chair, Section on Employment Discrimination, 
and Paul Secunda (Marquette), Chair, Section on Employee Benefits. 
 55.  This was the approach taken by the Labor Section in 2005 under the leadership of Professor 
Christopher Cameron, then Labor Section Chair, who moved the section program to the University of 
San Francisco Law School with the support of law school Dean Jeffrey Brand. Thanks are owed to 
Dean Brand who once again offered support for our relocation, giving his unequivocal assurance that 
the law school would accommodate us if necessary notwithstanding the significant uncertainty about 
our needs.  
 56.  During this time I was in contact with and assisted by David Harlan, a Local 2 member, and 
Riddhi Mehta-Neugebauer, an organizer, who kept us informed about developments in the labor dispute 
and the status of other “at risk” hotels so that we could provide our section members with up-to-date 
information about where to safely book accommodations. 
 57.  See E-mail from Susan Westerberg Prager, Executive Director and CEO, AALS & Jane La 
Barbara, Managing Director, AALS, to Section Chairs and Chairs-Elect (Oct. 8, 2010, 8:06 PM) [here-
inafter the October 8 E-mail] (on file with author).  
 58.  The AALS had indicated that it would not be able to grant all requests for relocation. See Sep-
tember 27 Letter, supra note 41, at 2-3 (acknowledging that the relocation process would “not [be] a 
comprehensive solution and warning that it “might not be able accommodate all requests”). In addition, 
the AALS relocation information did not explain the implications of that process on registrants’ confer-
ence fees. Some faculty were concerned that by registering and paying for the conference, we would be 
supporting the Hilton financially. I raised this issue with the AALS and was told that there would be no 
adjustment to the conference fee for registrants who intended to attend only the subset of programs re-
located out of the Hilton. 
 59.  See E-mail from author to AALS Section Chairs (Oct. 15, 2010, 4:45 PM) (on file with au-
thor). This distribution required some legwork. The AALS does not provide e-mail or other address lists 
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attached a copy of the Open Letter and copied Professors Klare, Peller, and 
Seidman, whom I knew to be the principal drafters of that letter.
60
 From 
that point forward, we worked closely to coordinate the efforts of their 
team with those of the employment law section leaders in order to strength-
en our appeal to section leaders and individual faculty. Our strategy was to 
bridge the gaps in the AALS relocation process, which had been opened 
only to section leaders. Speakers and organizers of non-section events did 
not receive the October 8 letter, nor were they provided any alternative av-
enue for requesting relocation. In addition, the AALS imposed several hur-
dles on section leaders seeking relocation. Sections were required to “ex-
plain the rationale for the[ir] request” and demonstrate that “all” section 
officers and executive committee members had engaged in “careful consid-
eration of the impacts on the planned program and agree that the change 
should be made.”61 In other words, the decision to relocate had to be not 
only deliberative, but also unanimous. 
Given these constraints, our strategy was twofold: encourage and fa-
cilitate section leaders’ use of the designated relocation process and urge 
speakers and participants to pressure program organizers to seek relocation. 
I followed up my e-mail to section leaders with a set of detailed instruc-
tions for complying with the AALS requirements, which included a sample 
“narrative” explaining the rationale for the request.62 Professors Klare, 
Peller, and Seidman sent personal e-mails directly to individual section 
leaders urging them to seek relocation and to individual speakers, particu-
larly those scheduled to participate in non-section events, urging them to 
contact program organizers and the AALS notwithstanding their exclusion 
from the formal relocation process. The union members and organizers re-
mained involved, sending tailored e-mails to these targets about the sub-
stance of the underlying dispute and the importance of seeking relocation. 
                                                                                                                                      
for faculty or law school use except for section lists that must be purchased. The e-mail sent by AALS 
to section leaders was addressed so as not to reveal the list of recipients or permit a “reply all” response. 
I am grateful to the University of Denver College of Law support staff who compiled the e-mail ad-
dresses of all section chairs and chairs-elect by cross-referencing lists of each section’s executive com-
mittee posted on the AALS website with the individual websites of various law schools. 
 60.  Prior to that, I had had no contact with Professors Klare, Peller, or Seidman. The Open Letter 
was initially distributed only to the addressees and those whose signatures were solicited. I became 
aware of the Klare-Peller-Seidman effort when the Open Letter was posted by Professor Martin Malin 
to two labor and employment law faculty listservs. 
 61.  See October 8 E-mail, supra note 57, at 3. 
 62.  E-mail from author to Section Leaders (Oct. 21, 2010, 4:17 PM) (on file with author). My e-
mail also attached a “revised” relocation form which I prepared (using the form provided by AALS) to 
reflect the addition of Parc 55 as a possible alternative location. Although the AALS stated in an e-mail 
that it would consider moving programs to the Parc 55, its form for requesting relocation, prepared and 
distributed subsequent to that announcement, listed only the Hotel Nikko and area law schools as the 
possible choices for relocation. 
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The result of this joint-effort was a groundswell of support. Our best 
estimate is that of ninety-one sections, approximately seventy-eight submit-
ted requests for relocation for seventy out of eighty-two programs.
63
 
Among those sections that did not submit requests, there were in some cas-
es individual leaders or speakers sympathetic to the boycott, but who 
lacked sufficient support from the section’s executive committee to satisfy 
the AALS’s unanimity requirement.64 Approximately two-thirds of the sec-
tion requests were granted.
65
 At least one non-section program relocated 
independently to a public space rather than meet in the Hilton.
66
 In addi-
tion, some speakers scheduled to participate in non-section sponsored 
events cancelled their appearances rather than participate in a program that 
remained at the Hilton.
67
 
4. The House of Representatives Resolution and Street Rally 
By all accounts the relocation effort was a success. Yet many re-
mained frustrated not only by the AALS’s initial decision not to relocate 
the conference as a whole, but the way in which it handled the subsequent 
section relocation request process. AALS did not inform individual sec-
tions whether their requests had been granted until mid-December, three 
weeks before the conference.
68
 In the interim, it issued a letter condemning 
                                                          
 63.  These figures were determined by cross-referencing the Annual Meeting schedule as it then 
appeared on the AALS website with the information received by me and/or Gary Peller from Section 
leaders as to whether they had or had not requested relocation 
 64.  This appears to have occurred with the Section on Admiralty and Maritime Law, see E-mail 
from Joan Vogel, Professor, Vermont Law School to Gary Peller, Professor, Georgetown Law Ctr. 
(November 8, 2010, 12:16 AM) (on file with author), and the Section on Property Law, see E-mail from 
Kali Murray, Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School to Gary Peller, Professor, 
Georgetown Law Ctr. (October 31, 2010, 10:45AM) (on file with author). 
 65.  This figure was determined by cross-referencing the location information posted in the final 
program with the requests for relocation of which we were aware. We do not know the reason some 
requests were denied. It is possible that the number of requests exceeded the capacity of the meeting 
space reserved by the AALS at alternate hotels, but it is uncertain how AALS determined which events 
to prioritize. Likewise we do not know if any requests were denied outright for reasons other than space 
constraints. 
 66.  The “hot topic” program, “The BP Blowout Oil Spill and Its Consequences” moved from its 
assigned Hilton location to a nearby church. 
 67.  See, e.g., E-mail from Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Professor, Indiana University Bloomington Col-
lege of Law to Indiana University Bloomington College of Law Faculty (Jan. 7, 2011, 10:37 AM) (on 
file with author); E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, UCLA, 
to AALS Executive Committee (Oct. 14, 2010, 10:55 PM) (on file with author). 
 68.  The AALS promised “updated program information” by December 16, 2010, seven weeks 
after the deadline for submitting relocation requests. See Letter from H. Reese Hansen, President, 
AALS et al., to Law School Deans  (Dec. 13, 2010) [hereinafter December 13 Letter] (on file with au-
thor). This left faculty members in a difficult position in determining whether to plan to attend the con-
ference. The AALS’s response to this situation was to offer a refund of conference registration fees to 
those canceling by December 1. However, as of December 1, it still had not provided any relocation 
information. Through a direct inquiry to the AALS, I was able to determine that the AALS had decided 
to grant cancelations through December 17. See E-mail from Jane La Barbera, Managing Director, 
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what it described as “inappropriate” tactics used by an unnamed “member 
of our community” to instill support for relocation.69 
While awaiting the results of the relocation process, Professors Klare, 
Peller, Seidman, and I turned our attention to ways in which we could make 
our voices heard at the meeting itself. We decided upon two different 
courses of action: pursuing adoption of a formal statement that the AALS 
should not site conferences at boycotted hotels and staging a street rally in 
support of the union and in protest of the AALS’s decision to remain at the 
Hilton. 
Professors Klare, Peller, and Seidman took on the task of preparing a 
resolution on the issue of labor disputes at conference venues for submis-
sion to the AALS House of Delegates, the governing body of the AALS 
comprised of representatives of each member law school. The goal was to 
elicit an official acknowledgement of the strong faculty sentiment, made 
evident by the overwhelming response to the relocation process, in favor of 
avoiding hotels subject to labor disputes. Given the history of labor unrest 
within the San Francisco hotel industry and the AALS’s handling of the 
2011 Meeting, the situation seemed destined to reoccur absent further in-
tervention. 
The final resolution, jointly introduced by Gary Peller, as the Repre-
sentative from the Georgetown Law Center, and me, in my capacity as 
Chair of the Labor Section, set forth “the sense of the AALS community” 
that the organization should avoid venues subject to labor disputes and ne-
gotiate protective language in its contracts to permit cancellation in the 
event that a labor dispute were to arise at a conference hotel.
70
 Despite its 
                                                                                                                                      
AALS, to author (Dec. 04, 2010, 7:23 PM) (on file with author). This appears to have been an internal 
decision that was never publically announced. In addition, the extension for conference fee reimburse-
ment did not address the problem of flights and hotel reservations made in anticipation of attendance. 
Thus, many faculty spent the weeks between October 29 and mid-December uncertain whether to make 
travel plans and ultimately having to make last minute and costly bookings. 
 69.  See December 13 Letter, supra note 68. Although the “member” was unnamed, the statement 
was clearly a reference to the outreach efforts of Professor Gary Peller, who did the bulk of the work of 
contacting individual section leaders and panelists. The letter went on to state that some of the faculty 
members contacted by this individual had felt “badgered” and “harassed” and suggested the individual 
had misrepresented himself as speaking on behalf of the AALS. We do not know the source of these 
complaints, if indeed they were made. Certainly at no time did Professor Peller or any member of our 
team purport to represent AALS. Indeed, the entire basis for our efforts was to express our opposition to 
the AALS’s position.   
  It also bears noting, that one person’s persuasion is another’s harassment, particularly where 
the message content is unwelcome. The blurriness of the distinction has been recognized in labor law 
jurisprudence, as has the reality that union organizing cannot occur without some element of pressure. 
See Cynthia Estlund, Freeing Employee Choice: The Case for Secrecy in Union Organizing and Voting, 
123 HARV. L. REV. F 10, 17 (2010) ("The line between coercion and cajoling is blurred ... but is crucial. 
The former is unlawful under section 8 of the NLRA, while energetic and persistent solicitation of un-
ion support among coworkers is not only lawful but protected by section 7").  
 70.  See Proposed Resolution of the Labor Relations and Employment Law Section (Nov. 17, 
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non-binding nature, the resolution was vigorously opposed by the AALS. 
In a strongly worded memo to the House of Representatives, AALS leader-
ship asserted that it serves as a fiduciary to the organization entrusted to de-
termine the location of meetings, including making case-by-case determi-
nations about how to deal with labor disputes.
71
 The memo warned that 
adoption of such “overly broad” language would eliminate necessary flexi-
bility and force it to make potentially costly changes that would adversely 
affect faculty and member schools.
72
 
The AALS leadership sounded similar themes at the House of Dele-
gates Meeting. Debate was sharply time constrained and limited to brief, 
relatively formal statements. In our allotted time to speak and our circulat-
ed statements, we emphasized that the resolution was non-binding and 
therefore consistent with the retention of discretion and flexibility desired 
by the Executive Committee.
73
 We pointed out that an articulated “sense of 
the faculty” represented the mildest type of resolution we could seek from 
the representatives and that the type of protective language we suggested 
adopting was standard fare in long-term contracts.
74
 
Because views were so divided on the issue, we requested a roll call 
vote on the resolution rather than a default voice vote. This ultimately 
proved to be a tactical error. During his remarks, President-Elect Michael 
Olivas made a plea for those that were uncertain to abstain. Not surprising-
ly given the tenor of the debate, particularly the Executive Committee’s 
emphasis on its authority, many representatives seemed to welcome that 
option. In the final count, the resolution was defeated, sixty-one to twenty-
four among those registering a vote.
75
 Forty-six representatives chose to 
abstain, a number that, if registered as “yes” votes, would have secured the 
                                                                                                                                      
2010) (on file with author). As initially prepared, the resolution would have committed the AALS to 
avoiding hotels or other conference venues subject to an active labor dispute. However, we ultimately 
jettisoned that version in favor of a non-binding expression of faculty sentiment which we believed 
would be less controversial and consequently easier to pass. 
 71.  Memorandum from H. Reese Hansen, President, AALS et al., to Members of the 2011 House 
of Representatives (Dec. 30, 2010) [hereinafter December 30 Statement] (on file with author). 
 72.  Id. at 1. The statement suggested that a decision to relocate could impair the organization’s 
ability to secure favorable contracts for future meetings and that a relocation could astronomically in-
crease law school organizational dues. Id. at 2. 
 73.  Transcript of the Association of American Law Schools, House of Representatives, First Ses-
sion, San Francisco, CA at 25-26 (Thursday, Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter House of Representatives Tran-
script] (on file with author). 
 74.  See id. at 26. Indeed, President Olivas remarked during the proceedings that the AALS already 
negotiates for such clauses in its contracts. Id. at 36. In light of this admission, it is difficult to under-
stand not only why the AALS opposed the resolution but also why it refused to consider relocating the 
conference at the outset and why it emphasized its contractual commitments in explaining that decision. 
 
 75.  Karen Sloan, AALS Defeats Bid to Boycott Hotels Engaged in Labor Disputes, NATIONAL L.J. 
(Jan. 7, 2011), <http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202477415640&slreturn=1>. 
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resolution’s passage. 
Whatever disappointment was occasioned by the vote at the House of 
Representatives meeting only confirmed the sentiment among some boy-
cott supporters that the best way to support the workers in their contest with 
the Hilton was to make a public stand. Prior to the Meeting, Professors 
Klare, Peller, and Seidman, along with other faculty coordinated with Local 
2 to plan a street rally in the front of the Hilton. The day after our defeat in 
the House of Representatives, dozens of law faculty and staff joined Local 
2 workers in a demonstration during the AALS Presidential Program, the 
cornerstone event of the Annual Meeting and one of the non-section events 
that the AALS had declined to relocate.
76
 The rally marked the anniversary 
of the Hilton boycott, called the preceding January. Media was in attend-
ance. Several professors, including Jack Getman and myself, joined Local 2 
members in addressing the crowd from the back of a pick up truck.
77
  
The campaign against the AALS ended on a high note, and happily so 
did the overall dispute. Just a few months after the Annual Meeting, Local 
2 achieved a favorable contract with hotel management. Under the new 
agreement, in effect through August 2013, workers receive a pay increase 
retroactive to the expiration of their prior contract and additional increases 
over the life of the contract totaling approximately two dollars per hour.
78
 
Health care coverage remains in effect at previous levels and continues to 
be fully paid by the Hilton, albeit with a ten dollar co-payment for depend-
ants.
79  
Housekeepers avoided any increase in room quotas and obtained a 
workload reduction for those assigned ten or more checkouts in a day.
80
   
Thus, after two years without a contract, Local 2 succeeded not only 
in holding the line on the critical issue of health benefits, but in securing a 
wage increase in the face of significant pressure to increase workload. This 
                                                          
 76.   Law Professors Back Local as It Marks Second Year of Hilton Boycott, 25 Lab. Rel. Wk. 
(BNA) No 62. (Jan. 13, 2011). 
 77.  Other speakers included former AALS President, Emma Coleman Jordan (Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center), Karl Klare (Professor, Northeastern University School of Law), 
Randy Shaw (local activist, attorney, journalist and Executive Director, Tenderloin Housing Clinic), 
and Local 2 members David Harlan (cook, Stanford Court), Robyn Shaheen (banquet server, Hilton 
Union Square), and  Johan Tahir (bartender, Hilton Union Square).  
 78.  See Hilton Reaches Pacts With UNITE HERE Covering San Francisco, Honolulu, Chicago, 
25 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) No. 389 (Mar. 10, 2011). 
 79.  See Benny Evangelista, Hilton, Union Reach Agreement in S.F.; Deal To Settle 18-Month 
Dispute, with Members Set to Vote Friday – Other Hotels Will Be Pressured, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 
2011, at D1; Hilton Reaches Pacts, supra note 78. In addition, the dental care benefits cap has increased 
from $1000 to $2000 and dependant and monthly co-payments for dependent health care are set at $10. 
See Evangelista, supra at D1. 
 80.  See Marc Norton, No Concessions: Hotel Workers Beat Hilton and Blackstone, Fight On, 
FogCityJournal.Com, <http://www.fogcityjournal.com/wordpress/2689/no-concessions-hotel-workers-
beat-hilton-and-blackstone-fight-on/> (last viewed Dec. 14, 20111). 
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was both a victory for Hilton workers and a pivotal event in the union’s re-
lationship with the San Francisco hotel industry.
81
 The Hilton contract rep-
resented the first settlement among more than fifty full-service hotels 
where workers had been without a contract since August 2009, and the pat-
tern for all future negotiations.
82
 As this Symposium goes to press, sixteen 
hotels have signed contracts modeled on the Hilton agreement. 
B. Learning from AALS and Local 2 
Was the AALS campaign a success? More importantly, what does it 
tell us about the power of labor movements? For the faculty boycott sup-
porters, the campaign had its disappointments, beginning with AALS’s re-
fusal to fully relocate the Annual Meeting and ending with the failed House 
of Representatives Resolution. Yet these losses were largely symbolic. 
While faculty were unable to obtain an institutional expression of solidarity 
with the workers, the boycott supporters clearly won on the academic 
“street,” achieving a de facto relocation despite the AALS’s intransigence. 
That success in the face of surprisingly strong opposition illustrates the 
power of grassroots action to achieve results in cases where more formal 
efforts may prove unavailing. At the same time, the struggle as a whole 
suggests the inevitability of tension between an institution and its individu-
al constituents that is the heart of labor/management conflict. 
1. Workers Versus Management; Faculty Versus AALS 
Analogizing between the AALS campaign and an actual organizing 
drive or labor dispute is a potentially fraught enterprise. Unlike the Local 2 
members protesting the conduct of the Hilton, the faculty members protest-
ing the decisions of the AALS were not engaged in a dispute with their 
employers. Because the AALS is a professional organization, and an organ-
ization of law schools rather than faculty, those who protested AALS ac-
tion faced little risk of repercussions. Even in their true employment rela-
tionships, faculty are uncommonly privileged, enjoying an exceptional 
degree of job security and significant voice in managing the institutions 
they serve.
83
  Whereas the Local 2 members who took action against the 
                                                          
 81.  See Hotel Workers and Hilton Worldwide Reach Settlement in San Francisco, ONE DAY 
LONGER SF, <http://www.onedaylongersf.org/?p=1753> (last viewed Dec. 9, 2011) (describing Hilton 
settlement as a “major breakthrough in citywide hotel negotiations”). 
 82.  See Evangelista, supra note 78, at D1; Hilton Reaches Pacts, supra note 77. 
 83.  For  this reason, the NLRB has held that faculty are managerial employees not protected by 
the NLRA. See NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980). Of course the degree of control faculty 
exert over their places of work vary both among and within institutions and status differences persist 
within the legal Academy. See Marina Angel, The Modern University and its Law School: Hierarchical, 
Bureaucratic Structures Replace Coarchical, Collegial Ones; Women Disappear from Tenure Track 
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Hilton put their livelihoods on the line, what was at stake for the faculty 
supporting them were personal conviction and professional reputation.
84
 
Yet it is perhaps because of the special position of faculty and the mis-
sion of the legal academy that the conflict between faculty and the AALS is 
so telling. One would have expected a professional organization of law 
schools to be welcoming of appeals by faculty on any issue of institutional 
concern, purely as a matter of governance. As a requirement of AALS 
membership, a law school must “vest in the faculty primary responsibility 
for determining institutional policy.”85 Engaging the faculty of member 
schools on an issue of AALS policy would have been consistent with that 
mandate and in keeping with the spirit of academic debate. That does not 
mean that the AALS should have bowed to faculty conviction, but rather 
that it ought to have been more receptive to vetting its decision to remain at 
the Hilton within the AALS community. Yet throughout the campaign, the 
AALS appeared resistant to discussion. It communicated its decision not to 
relocate as a fait accompli through a formal statement of the Executive 
Committee. AALS leaders did not speak individually, and the committee as 
a whole remained relatively silent after pronouncing its decision. In addi-
tion, the AALS never addressed the substantive challenges to its decision 
contained in the Open Letter or the plea in the Joint Request for Reconsid-
eration to engage in a dialogue on the issue. Indeed, the AALS never di-
rectly responded to those appeals at all.
86
 
This reaction was especially troubling given what was at stake. In call-
ing for the AALS to honor the boycott, faculty were entreating the organi-
zation to support an assertion of legal rights by those with limited bargain-
                                                                                                                                      
and Reemerge as Caregivers: Tenure Disappears or Becomes Unrecognizable, 38 AKRON L. REV. 789, 
791 (2005) (describing the “contingent workers of higher education,” who are principally women and 
comprise a “permanent underclass” within the Academy). However, in light of law school accreditation 
rules, it is fair to suggest that even faculty on the lower rungs of the legal academic hierarchy have 
greater security that many workers in the for-profit sector. See ABA Standards for Approval of Law 
Schools, standards 405(c) & (d) (2011-12), available at <http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/2011_201 2_aba_standards_chapter4. authcheck-
dam.pdf > (requiring law schools to provide clinical faculty “a form of security of position reasonably 
similar to tenure” and to legal writing faculty “security of position and other rights and privileges of 
faculty membership as may be necessary to (1) attract and retain [well qualified faculty] and (2) safe-
guard academic freedom”). 
 84.  That is not to discount the significance of the latter.  For some faculty, supporting the boycott 
and taking a stand against the AALS meant risking professional relationships and possible rebuke or 
criticism from those who did not share their views.     
 85.  Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc., § 6-5 (as amended through Jan. 
2008), available at <http://aals.org/about_handbook_bylaws.php>.  
 86.  In addition to its failure to engage with faculty boycott supporters, the AALS did not respond 
to appeals from members of the union. As a result, the AALS was operating without complete infor-
mation when it made its decision not to relocate the Meeting. Most notably, it assumed that hotels on 
the union’s “at risk” list, including the Parc 55, could not be used as alternative locations. See supra 
note 52 and accompanying text. 
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ing power and, in effect, to speak out on a matter of public concern. Such 
acts are part and parcel with being a lawyer. The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct define a lawyer’s role not only as an advocate for a particu-
lar client but also as a “public citizen,” someone who promotes and culti-
vates knowledge of the law on issues of social importance.
87
 The Hilton 
boycott presented an opportunity for law faculty to model civic engage-
ment. Indeed, some boycott supporters saw their participation not only as 
an ideological pursuit, but also as an act of professional responsibility as 
law teachers.
88
 The AALS has in the past honored this notion of the civic 
responsibility of lawyers in its institutional statements and in its program-
matic undertakings.
89
 Yet the 2010 Executive Committee failed to take the 
opportunity to put such words into action. 
Instead AALS leaders invoked their responsibilities as lawyers in one 
narrow way. In announcing its decision to remain at the Hilton, the AALS 
asserted that it owed a special obligation to “honor its contractual commit-
ments.”90 Whether honoring the contract actually required the AALS to 
remain at the Hilton during the union boycott was far from clear.
91
 Indeed, 
all evidence suggests that AALS had significant flexibility to alter its con-
tractual obligations under the circumstances.
92
 However, even if the organ-
ization was hard bound to its contract, asserting such a duty in isolation 
emphasized one limited aspect of lawyers’ work – understanding and ap-
plying formal rules – to the exclusion of any other. AALS in effect used the 
risk of legal liability as a shield, precluding consideration of lawyers’ deep-
                                                          
 87.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. cmt.1 (2010); see also id. pmbl. cmt. 6 (“[A] law-
yer should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system 
because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to 
maintain their authority.”); see generally Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, “Public Service Must 
Begin at Home”: The Lawyer as Civics Teacher in Everyday Practice, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1207 
(2009); Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, The Obligation of Lawyers to Heal Civic Culture: Confronting 
the Ordeal of Incivility in the Practice of Law, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 40-52 (2011) (ex-
ploring the role of lawyers as civics teachers in their daily practices); Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as 
Citizens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1323 (2009) (criticizing the under-developed contemporary un-
derstanding of lawyers’ role as public citizens). 
 88.  See Open Letter, supra note 45, at 2 (“In our view it is part of a law professor’s job to model 
for students a commitment to principle.”). 
 89.  See Rachel F. Moran, President, AALS, President’s Message: Transformative Law, Address 
before the AALS House of Representatives at the 2009 Annual Meeting (Jan. 6, 2009) (calling on the 
legal academy to resurrect the “citizen-lawyer” who, through “transformative law,” can “challenge and 
reconfigure social institutions”), available at  <http://aals.org/services_newsletter_presMarch09.php>. 
 90.  September 27 Letter, supra note 41, at 1. 
 91.  The AALS consistently rebuffed requests to produce its hotel contract citing unspecified con-
fidentiality concerns. See E-mail from H. Reese Hansen, President, AALS to Gary Peller, Professor, 
Georgetown Law Ctr. (Dec. 15, 2010, 1:05 PM) (on file with author).  
 92.  During the House of Representatives Meeting, President Olivas admitted that AALS venue 
contracts contain force majeure clauses.  See House of Representatives Transcript, supra note 73, at 36. 
Certainly the organization’s ability to relocate two-thirds of the section programs, seemingly without 
penalty, appears to confirm as much. 
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er responsibilities as public citizens. 
What is so disturbing then is that an organization that might have been 
exceptionally sensitive to the rights at stake and in a unique position to take 
a public stand sought to distance itself from the dispute and, at times, di-
minish its importance. The AALS asserted that it was remaining neutral, a 
position that is untenable in a consumer boycott.
93
   Boycotts succeed by 
leveraging the solidarity of those whose business sustains the employer.  
Honoring a boycott supports workers; failing to do so supports manage-
ment.  The AALS’s suggestion that remaining at the Hilton was a neutral 
act was inaccurate if not misleading.  More problematic were the organiza-
tion’s insinuations that the Hilton dispute was insignificant because the 
workers were not on a strike.
94
 Such statements betray a lack of apprecia-
tion for the economic and legal realities that make strikes untenable for 
workers and frequently ineffective as pressure tactics.  Strikes are a weapon 
of choice only where the removal of workers’ services can meaningfully 
impair company operations. In the hotel industry, where employers can 
count on a steady flow of low-skilled labor, strikes places workers’ jobs at 
risk while exerting only limited pressure on the employer. This is especial-
ly true in times of economic hardship and high unemployment like the re-
cent Great Recession. But while the loss of its workforce may not seriously 
harm a hotel, the loss of its customers will.  Thus, a boycott is not a lesser 
tool used in lower stakes disputes, but rather an innovative and more nim-
ble way of achieving the strike’s basic goal  – to interfere with a company’s 
ability to do business until it agrees to fair terms of employment.   
That the AALS failed to understand these dynamics, or chose to ig-
nore them, suggests how formidable a challenge unions face in eliciting the 
public support necessary to pursue a successful corporate campaign. It can 
only be more difficult to persuade commercial enterprises whose sympa-
thies may naturally align with management. Such entities are likely to have 
less incentive to engage publically, less understanding of the legal rights at 
stake, and constituents with less ability to speak and act from personal con-
viction.
95
 
                                                          
 93.  See, e.g., December 13 Letter, supra note 68, at 1. 
 94.  See, e.g., Id.;  December 30 Statement, supra note 71, at 2; House of Representatives Tran-
script supra note 73,  at 35. President-Elect Olivas went further, suggesting that law faculty had manu-
factured the workers’ picket. See id.  
 95.  Professor Cynthia Estlund expresses a similar concern in considering the significance of the 
Yale University clerical campaign detailed in Getman’s book. Despite the union’s “nearly unparalleled 
advantages,” including the sympathies of faculty and students as well as the practical impediments the 
University faced in responding to the campaign, the union won by only six votes. See Cynthia Estlund, 
“It Takes a Movement” – But What Does it Take to Mobilize the Workers (in the U.S. and China)? 15 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y. J., 507, 510 (2011).  
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Indeed, the irony of the AALS campaign is that, in dealing with facul-
ty, the AALS acted the part of big management. Its reaction to the boycott 
supporters paralleled the moves typically made by companies attempting to 
subvert a union campaign. Its failure to respond to the Open Letter and its 
delay in granting relocation requests were reminiscent of the stalling and 
stonewalling unions often receive in response to their demands. The 
AALS’s relocation process, offered as an accommodation to boycott sup-
porters, was akin to a partial concession, the type of benefit that is typically 
unlawful during the course of a union campaign
96
 and could constitute im-
proper unilateral action during collective bargaining.
97
 The AALS’s public 
rebuke of one boycott supporter in an attempt to discredit the relocation ef-
fort echoed the type of retaliation typically visited on known union sup-
porters. Even in the context of opposing the House of Representatives reso-
lution, the arguments advanced by the AALS sounded themes commonly 
invoked by employers in opposing union demands. It argued that the reso-
lution would constrain its flexibility and result in increased costs to the or-
ganization that would impair operations and ultimately be borne by facul-
ty.
98
 
In this way, the AALS debacle was not only an illustration of the 
modern union campaign in action but a metaphor for the very struggle that 
necessitates it. For all of their privileges, faculty entreating the AALS to 
support the boycott were handled much the way rank-and-file union sup-
porters are by their employers. Why the AALS took this tack is unknown. 
Perhaps it is a natural inclination for those in control to hold fast to their 
advantage even where profit is not a motive. What is clear is that the dis-
pute between law professors and the AALS bore the hallmarks of the fun-
damental power struggle that undergirds all labor conflict.
99
 Thus, the 
AALS dispute poignantly revealed both how difficult it is for unions to 
succeed and why it matters so much that they do. 
                                                          
 96.  See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 408-09 (1964) (finding that employer’s an-
nouncement of holiday, vacation, and overtime benefits shortly before representation election constitut-
ed an unlawful interference with workers’ Section 7 rights under Section 8(a)(1)). 
 97.  See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) (finding that employer violated duty to bargain 
in good faith by implementing sick leave plan and wage and bonus increases unilaterally without prior 
discussion with union). 
 98.  See December 30 Statement, supra note 71, at 2 (suggesting that the cancellation of a hotel 
contract as a result of a labor dispute would result in a fifty to eighty percent increase in law school 
dues). 
 99.  See Michael C. Duff, Of Courage, Tumult, and the Smash Mouth Truth: A Union Side Apolo-
gia, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y. J., 521, 524  (2011) (describing the existence of this conflict as among 
the “first principles of labor realities” and a fundamental “axiom” in the belief system of “organizable” 
workers). 
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2. Of Legal Losses and Street Victories 
The silver lining in the AALS campaign was the success of the section 
relocation process, a victory that is testament to the type of grassroots ac-
tion that Getman acclaims. After reaching a dead end in seeking institu-
tional support for the boycott, those of us committed to the union’s cause 
proceeded at the faculty level. In doing so, we operated in the tradition of a 
worker organizing committee. We reached out directly to other faculty, 
sharing information about the conflict and details about the AALS’s pro-
cess that we believed had not been adequately communicated. We an-
swered questions and provided support for filing relocation requests. 
Like the organizing efforts Getman describes, the voices and experi-
ences of those affected were an important force. This included the perspec-
tive of the workers, whose entreaties I forwarded to all section leaders in 
urging them to request relocation. It also included expressions of personal 
sentiment from faculty. Over the course of our dispute with the AALS, 
committed professors, moved by the events that were unfolding, shared 
their views publicly. These were not just statements of ideological convic-
tion, but also stories of personal experience. Professor Hiroshi Motomura 
explained his decision to pull out of the AALS Presidential event in an e-
mail to the Executive Committe about his father, who had been a hotel 
cook and a Local 2 member:  “He never earned much,” Professor Motomu-
ra wrote, “but what little he made was thanks to his union…. And the fact 
that the union stood up for him was a big part of what self-respect he had as 
a working person.”100  Urging the organization to carefully weigh proceed-
ing with the conference versus honoring the boycott, he noted “my father 
sometimes walked the very picket line that attendees at the AALS annual 
meeting may need to cross if you do not reconsider.”101 This powerful 
statement was widely disseminated. 
In contrast, we were not able to replicate this approach in preparing 
for the House of Representatives meeting, where our labor dispute resolu-
tion ultimately failed. This was partly due to our limited interaction with 
representatives. The AALS did not comply with our request for the names 
of each school’s representative and we lacked the time necessary to gener-
ate our own list and use it effectively.
102
 Thus, our communication with 
                                                          
 100.  E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, supra note 67. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  In contrast to the section leadership information that we used in our relocation campaign, the 
names of the law school representatives do not appear on the AALS website. Professor Peller attempted 
to contact schools individually for their delegate information and created an electronic forum for dis-
cussion of the resolution. However, by that time, it was late into the December holiday season (and 
close to the date of the Annual Meeting), making it difficult to generate interest in and fully vet the un-
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representatives in advance of the meeting was limited to the transmission of 
our written statements by the AALS. This hurt our ability to convince fac-
ulty to act in the face of the Executive Committee’s request that they re-
spect its discretion. The AALS essentially asked the Representatives to 
trust the judgment of their leaders. To the faculty who had tried hard to 
convince the AALS to honor the boycott, only to face institutional intransi-
gence and imperfect solutions, that request seemed preposterous.
103
 But the 
history of our campaign most likely was not fully or widely known among 
the Representatives. 
We were also hindered by our lack of familiarity with the procedure 
and culture of the House of Representatives. The environment in which the 
resolution was debated was highly regimented.
104
 Due to time constraints, 
we emphasized the technical aspects of our resolution – the fact that it was 
non-binding and that we were asking the AALS merely to affirm faculty 
sentiment and to incorporate standard protections in its contracts. Although 
some faculty spoke out about their personal support for the boycott, this 
was not a key theme, nor was the environment conducive to such senti-
ment. 
Finally, and perhaps most critically, we made a mistake in requesting 
a roll call vote. In part, that choice reflected a lack of experience with the 
forum. Our goal was to avoid the voice vote that is the House of Represent-
atives default procedure given the seriousness of the issue and the likeli-
hood of a close result. A roll call was the available alternative identified in 
the House of Representatives procedural rules, and we did not consider 
other options.
105
 In this regard we failed to realize the constraints faced by 
those we wished to persuade. The Representatives are a diverse group in 
terms of seniority and experience. Some were new to AALS; some, unten-
ured. President-Elect Olivas presented a vehement statement in opposition 
to the resolution, emphasizing the Executive Committee’s superior ability 
                                                                                                                                      
derlying issues.  
 103.  For instance, the AALS asserted that it would establish a committee to consider the problem of 
labor disputes going forward, a promise that lacked credibility in light of the organization’s consistent 
unwillingness to dialogue about its decision in the course of the dispute.  See House of Representatives 
Transcript, supra note 73, at 35.  Similarly, the AALS suggested that its hands had been tied in consid-
ering alternative locations given the number of San Francisco hotels at risk of dispute.  See id. at 36. 
Such statements were disingenuous given the union’s clear assurances that “at risk” hotels like the Parc 
55 were not subject to an active labor dispute and would not experience a job action during the course 
of the Meeting.   
 104.  Debate was limited to thirty-five minutes and structured so that resolution proponents received 
fifteen minutes, followed by fifteen minutes for those opposed, with three minutes reserved for final 
remarks. See id. at 22-23.  Due to this time allocation, Professor Gary Peller, the resolution’s co-
sponsor, was unable to present his full closing statement in support of the resolution. See id. at 48. 
 105.  At one point during the proceedings, Professor Marina Angel, the delegate from Temple Law 
School, called for a closed ballot, but that request was never debated or ruled on.  See id. at 42. 
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to make decisions about how to handle its contracts and the risk of labor 
disputes.
106
 Given the option to abstain, Representatives were persuaded to 
demur in deference to the Committee rather than publically contradict its 
assertion of authority. In short, AALS leadership succeeded in framing the 
resolution as an ill-considered challenge to the established order, and we 
had not laid the groundwork necessary to win in spite of this. 
The contrast between our loss on the House of Representatives resolu-
tion and the result of the section relocation process offers a useful analogy 
for reflecting on UNITE HERE’s organizing strategy. Irrespective of the 
final vote, the faculty campaign to honor the boycott succeeded: through 
peer-to-peer outreach, we were able to relocate the bulk of the conference 
despite the AALS’s refusal to do so. That grassroots efforts are at times su-
perior to more formal undertakings – including those grounded in law – is a 
lesson consistent with the message of Getman’s book. In pursuing its com-
prehensive campaign strategy, UNITE HERE has consciously eschewed 
the NLRB election and unfair labor practices processes as unworkable for 
unions.
107
  Focusing instead on the support of the rank-and-file and leverag-
ing non-traditional forms of pressure, it has succeeded in expanding 
through voluntary recognition and neutrality agreements. Where legal rules 
or governing institutions are inhospitable, victories can and must be 
achieved without them. 
That does not mean that law or legal reform should be abandoned. 
Getman believes that the National Labor Relations Act remains important 
and offers a variety of proposals for making the statute more relevant for 
unions. Among them is a call for increased union access to workers.
108
 
Without access it is impossible for unions to do the grassroots work neces-
sary not only to organize particular workplaces but to instill the type of sol-
idarity that ultimately sustains strong labor movements. The AALS cam-
paign bears this out. We were able to generate support for relocation among 
the sections because the names and e-mail addresses of their leaders were 
publically available.
109
 In contrast, there was no readily available list of 
delegates, and when the AALS refused to supply one, we were unable to 
create our own in time to make effective personal appeals before the Annu-
                                                          
 106.  We had originally hoped that the Resolution would be unopposed given its nonbinding nature; 
subsequently we assumed that the Executive Committee would rely on its written statement of opposi-
tion.  
 107.  See supra Part II.B. 
 108.  See GETMAN, supra note 3, at 204; supra Part II.B. 
 109.  The AALS website lists the executive committee members and their institutional affiliations 
for each section, and most law schools post contact information, including e-mail addresses, for their 
faculty members. We were able to quickly generate an e-mail list of all AALS section leaders by cross-
referencing these sources. 
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al Meeting. If the delegates had been AALS employees and we had been 
organizers trying to reach them, the AALS would have been required to 
produce the list, but only after we had already generated enough support to 
file for an election.
110
 The list would have included only names and physi-
cal addresses, not e-mails,
111
 and the AALS could have barred us from en-
tering its workplace and surrounding private property.
112  
It most likely 
could also have barred us from contacting workers through its e-mail sys-
tem (if we were able to somehow discover workers’ company e-mail ad-
dresses on our own) and prevented the delegate-workers from communi-
cating with one another about the union through company e-mail.
113
 
Getman wants to amend current access rules to give unions equal time 
to respond to employers’ anti-union rhetoric. His key targets are the captive 
audience speech, in which the employer assembles its workers to hear its 
case against the union, and the Supreme Court’s Lechmere decision, which 
prohibited union organizers from entering an employer’s parking lot.114 
What the AALS campaign adds to Getman’s critique is the importance of a 
particular form of access – the ability to reach workers electronically. In 
seeking support for the relocation process, we relied almost exclusively on 
e-mail, which allowed us to connect instantaneously with hundreds of law 
professors at schools across the country. The electronic format meant we 
were also able to provide faculty with easy access to supporting resources, 
including forwarded content about the labor dispute, links to information 
necessary for completing the AALS relocation forms, and soft copies of 
sample forms.
115
 Such an effort would have been impossible in the pre-
internet days of leaflet organizing.
116
 
                                                          
 110.  See Excelsior Underwear, Inc. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239 (1966); see also Technology Service 
Solutions, 332 N.L.R.B. 1096, 1098–99 (2000) (refusing to require dissemination of Excelsior list to aid 
union’s pre-petition organizing efforts notwithstanding fact that employees, who worked from their 
homes across multi-state region, were unusually difficult to identify). 
 111.  See Trs. of Columbia Univ., 350 N.L.R.B. 574, 576 (2007) (finding employer had no obliga-
tion to provide e-mail addresses of bargaining unit employees despite fact that employees worked 
aboard ship and would not receive mail sent to their homes during election campaign). 
 112.  See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 537 (1992). 
 113.  See Guard Publishing Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111 (2007) (finding that absent discrimination 
on the basis of union activity an employer’s policy restricting employees’ personal use of company e-
mail does not unlawfully interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights). 
 114.  GETMAN, supra note 3, at 182-83. 
 115.  For instance, over the course of the campaign we forwarded to faculty an e-mail from a work-
er about the substance of the dispute and links to the union’s “green” list of acceptable hotels. During 
the relocation process we provided section leaders with links to the AALS’s official list of officers for 
each executive committee so as to ensure that section chairs could achieve the unanimous support re-
quired for relocation. We also amended and re-circulated the AALS’s relocation form, which had been 
distributed before the AALS agreed to allow sections to move to the Parc 55, so that section leaders 
could easily select that hotel as their preferred venue. 
 116. The importance of electronic communication in spawning and supporting grassroots action is 
borne out by recent world events. Social media resources are widely credited with enabling and sup-
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Legal reform aimed at enhancing electronic access could therefore 
make a meaningful difference in unions’ abilities to generate and sustain 
worker-centered movements. As this symposium goes to press, the Obama 
Board is poised to address a number of access issues that bear on electronic 
communication. Currently an administrative rule is pending that would re-
quire employers to provide their Excelsior lists – the required document 
identifying workers in the relevant bargaining unit – in both digital and 
print format and to include worker e-mail addresses in addition to physical 
contact information.
117
 The Board is also set to revisit its standard for de-
termining whether an employer has discriminated in denying union access 
to its property, an issue that has implications for both unions’ and workers’ 
ability to use company- owned technology.
118
 Finally, it has issued com-
plaints in a number of cases involving workers’ use of social media.119 
These cases recognize that employees who post information about griev-
ances and other work-related issues may be engaged in concerted activi-
ty.
120
 Victories in such cases would insulate some social media activity 
from employer retaliation, enabling workers’ use of those resources for un-
ion organizing and other collective action. 
Developments like these could bring labor law into the twenty-first 
                                                                                                                                      
porting the coinciding protests against oppressive political regimes which became the Arab Spring. See, 
e.g., Jennifer Preston, Movement Began with Outrage and a Facebook Page that Gave It an Outlet, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2011, at A10, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/world/middleeast/ 
06face.html?pagewanted=all>; Kevin Govern, Op-Ed, The Twitter Revolutions: Social Media in the 
Arab Spring, JURIST (Oct. 22, 2011), <http://jurist.org/forum/2011/10/kevin-govern-twitter-
revolutions.php>.  
 117.  See Representation – Case Procedures, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,812 (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 
101-03). 
 118.  See Roundy’s Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (Nov. 12, 2010). The Board has requested briefing on 
the degree to which an employer may lawfully distinguish between different forms of solicitation on its 
property in prohibiting the presence of non-employee union representatives. Id. The same issue arises in 
cases involving employer retaliation against employees who transmit union messages via company e-
mail. Guard Publishing Co., a 2007 decision of the Bush Board, held that an employer could lawfully 
discipline an employee for sending a union solicitation via e-mail pursuant to the employer’s policy 
despite its tolerance of e-mail use for personal solicitations. See 351 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1116 (2007). A 
union win in Roundy’s would likely make it difficult for employers to draw such distinctions. It would 
not however prevent employers from prohibiting all non-work related use of its technology. . Several 
scholars have called for reform that would affirmatively allow greater worker access to e-mail. See, e.g., 
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Promoting Employee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for Compre-
hensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765 (2011); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet 
Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262 (2008); Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, The National 
Labor Relations Act in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 
(2000); G. Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of the Right to Workplace Representation: Reasonably 
Moving from the Middle of the Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 
(2003). 
 119.  See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., NLRB ALJ No.3-CA-27872 (September 2, 2011); 
Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., NLRB ALJ No. 13-CA-46452 (Sept. 28, 2011). 
 120.  Scholars have made a similar argument with respect to off-job blogging activity. See Rafael 
Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers: Employee Blogging and Legal Re-
form, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (2007). 
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century, however belatedly, empowering unions and workers to create a 
strong labor movement. Thus, one lesson to be drawn from both Getman’s 
book and the AALS campaign is that legal and extra-legal action are not 
dichotomous. Efforts to better workers’ lives need not and should not be 
hamstrung by retrograde rules and policies, but law reform can enhance un-
ions’ ability to conduct the grassroots outreach that inspires movements 
and, in some cases, achieves legal change. 
IV. CONCLUSION: QUESTIONS & REFLECTIONS ON THE POWER OF UNIONS 
So what lies ahead for labor and for labor law? The participants in this 
Symposium offer various perspectives on the viability of both effective la-
bor movements and meaningful legal reform. Their contributions range 
from an historical and narrative account of an important labor movement 
victory,
121
 to a comparative perspective on the potential for effective labor 
unrest domestically and in China,
122
 to an exploration of the mindset and 
messaging required to inspire labor movement workers,
123
 to an inside view 
of the workings of the NLRB and their effect on labor law and policy.
124
 
Like Getman’s work and my own contribution, several of the papers draw 
on the authors’ personal experiences – as workers, organizers, volunteers, 
and labor officials.
125
 
Maria Ontiveros’ contribution tells the story of the 1972-74 Amalga-
mated Clothing Workers of America’s (ACWA) strike at Farah Manufac-
turing in El Paso, Texas.
126
 Though the ACWA followed a traditional or-
ganizing model in many respects – pursuing the NLRB election and unfair 
labor practices processes while availing itself of the strike weapon – the un-
ion also employed many of the same techniques that UNITE HERE would 
ultimately refine in forging its comprehensive campaign strategy more than 
a decade later. The ACWA vigorously pursued a consumer boycott on the 
national level, forged broad connections with external actors and institu-
                                                          
 121.  Maria L. Ontiveros, Building a Movement with Immigrant Workers: The 1972-74 Strike and 
Boycott at Farah Manufacturing, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y. J. 479  (2011).   
 122.  Estlund, supra note 95. 
 123.  Duff, supra note 99. 
 124.  Dennis P. Walsh, Procedural Barriers That Prevent the NLRB from Resolving Major Workers 
Rights Issues, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y. J., 545 (2011). 
 125.  Prior to entering the legal profession, Professor Michael Duff worked as a unionized airline 
ramp worker, shop steward, and ultimately an organizer for Teamsters. Duff, supra note 95, at 522. 
While in law school, Professor Cynthia Estlund served as a student attorney to the Yale clerical workers 
and played an active role in their successful organizing effort. See GETMAN supra note 3, at 64-65; 
Estlund, supra note 95, at 508. Deputy General Counsel Dennis Walsh is a former member of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board. See Members of the NLRB since 1935, NLRB.GOV, 
<http://nlrb.gov/members-nlrb-1935> (last visited Dec. 8, 2011). 
 126.  Ontiveros, supra note 121, passim. 
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tions (including Catholic church leaders, national political figures, and the 
New York Central Labor Council), and promulgated a powerful message 
about the humanity and dignity of the largely Chicana workforce that ran 
the Farah plant.
127
 Professor Ontiveros concludes that the ACWA succeed-
ed because it not only used the law to its advantage, but also because it 
linked the Farah labor movement with the larger Chicano/a civil rights 
movement.
128
 She suggests that to achieve their goals unions must empow-
er their workers, remain true to democratic ideals, and offer a “values-
based message” that goes beyond demanding better pay and employment 
terms.
129
 
 Cynthia Estlund’s contribution expresses a more skeptical view of the 
potential for a sustained and successful labor movement, at least in the 
United States.
130
  She agrees with Getman’s proposals for labor law reform 
and finds inspiration in the episodes he recounts, but worries that American 
workers lack the “taste for battle” necessary for achieving not only union 
victories but also legislative change.
131
  She contrasts the situation of 
American workers today with those in contemporary China where labor un-
rest threatens to disrupt the social order, much as it did in the U.S. prior to 
the passage of the NLRA.
132
 Paradoxically, it may be that Chinese workers, 
who lack the basic constitutional and statutory protections American work-
ers enjoy, are better situated to produce and sustain the type of successful 
labor and social movement that Getman describes.
133
 
As if in answer to the questions raised by Professor Estlund, Michael 
Duff’s contribution offers an expression of faith in workers’ instinctive un-
derstanding of the fundamental struggle between management and labor 
and their willingness, when provoked, to “produc[e] . . . tumult.”134 Draw-
ing on his personal experience as a unionized airline worker and union or-
ganizer, Duff develops a picture of the “original position” worker – one 
who is inherently receptive to, but must still be convinced of, the need for 
unions – and a corresponding message about the value of organized labor 
that speaks to originalist ideology.
135
 He suggests that “authentic” labor or-
ganizers can deliver this message – one that is honest about the limits of 
law, that engages skepticism about the benevolence of employers, and that 
                                                          
 127.  See id. at 490-93. 
 128.  See id. at 502-03. 
 129.  Id. at 503. 
 130.  Estlund, supra note 95, passim. 
 131.  Id. at 519. 
 132.  See id. at 513-14. 
 133.  See id. at 514. 
 134.  Duff, supra note 99, at 526. 
 135.  Id. passim. 
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taps primordial feelings of fairness and solidarity – in a way that awakens 
labor movement workers.
136
 
The piece by Dennis Walsh turns our attention inward to the workings 
of the Board to ask what reforms might make the institution more relevant 
to the labor movement.
137
  Walsh argues that both the appointment and con-
firmation process for Board members and the absence of deadlines for 
Member action delay the Board’s decision making process and lead to ever 
more polarized results that are at risk of being overturned when Board 
composition changes.
138
  The upshot is that Board action is neither swift 
nor definitive enough to have a meaningful impact on critical issues of la-
bor policy.
139
 Recognizing the limits of internal deadlines that rely on self-
enforcement, he calls for a “return to a more rational nomination and ap-
pointment process . . . which will remove [Members’] temptation to hold 
up cases until a satisfactory lineup of Board members come along.”140 
My own views of the power and potential for a viable labor movement 
have fluctuated since the 2011 Meeting. I left San Francisco feeling that 
our partial victory was bittersweet. Not only was I disappointed about the 
result of the resolution process, I was ambivalent about the value and sig-
nificance of our street-level success. Law professors are an easy group to 
inspire. Our jobs not only allow us uncommon flexibility and freedom to 
carry through on our ideals, but arguably compel us to do so. It was hard to 
imagine the AALS campaign as a sustainable model for creating move-
ments among average workers burdened with all of the demands and dis-
tractions of their day-to-day lives. Even accepting credit for what we 
achieved, I was acutely aware that the AALS campaign was just a small 
skirmish in a much larger battle. Upon the conclusion of the Annual Meet-
ing, our dispute with the AALS ended; but the workers’ struggle for a new 
contract, already in its second year, waged on. I feared that what we had 
produced was a show of support, meaningful to those who had participated, 
but the effect of which was more aesthetic than real. 
However, I have since grown more optimistic. This change owes in 
part to the swift resolution of the Hilton dispute. Just two months after the 
Annual Meeting, Local 2 succeeded in obtaining a contract on terms far 
more favorable than had seemed possible given the hotel’s position up to 
that point.
141
 At first I saw the timing as a fortuity, but have become con-
                                                          
 136.  Id. at 475. 
 137.  Walsh, supra note 124, passim. 
 138.  See id. at 546-48. 
 139.  See id. at 548. 
 140.  Id. at 553. 
 141.  See supra Part III.A.4. 
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vinced that the faculty who supported the boycott share a small claim to the 
union’s victory.142 The activism of individual professors in embracing the 
union’s cause was a unique event. Our involvement validated the workers’ 
experience and demonstrated solidarity across socio-economic lines. As a 
practical matter, it also garnered media attention.
143
 Not long after our 
street protest, Hilton management brought in a new negotiating team more 
amenable to the union’s demands and more committed to reaching a con-
tract. 
Another reason for my renewed faith in the power of movements is 
the recent eruption of political and social action seeking to better the posi-
tion of working people. The trend began in Madison, Wisconsin, where 
during the winter of 2011, tens of thousands of people flooded the capitol 
building and demonstrated across the state to protest a bill removing the 
collective bargaining rights of public employees.
144
 It has continued with 
Occupy Wall Street, a grassroots movement opposing income inequality 
and corporate power that began with a series of public demonstrations in 
downtown Manhattan and has since inspired sister movements in major cit-
ies throughout the United States and abroad.
145
 
Of course, social protest at this level is both rare and hard to sustain. 
Eventually public spaces must be cleared; protestors go home; faculty re-
turn to their classes. But such moments of engagement reverberate, enter-
ing the public discourse and triggering other forms of protest, including 
more formal action. Since the events in Madison, two republican lawmak-
ers have been recalled, and efforts are underway to remove Governor Scott 
Walker.
146
 Two federal lawsuits challenging the Wisconin law are pend-
                                                          
 142. David Harlan, a hotel cook and Local 2 Boycott Committee Member had this to say about the 
faculty campaign: “I do believe that the AALS trauma was definitely a case of the small snowball, turn-
ing into a larger snowball, turning into an avalanche. Everyone from the AALS and all of their sacrific-
es absolutely have a right to celebrate this not only as a L[ocal] 2 victory but a victory for the AALS 
activists who played such an important role in reaching that settlement.” E-mail from David Harlan to 
author (July 14, 2011, 7:35 PM) (on file with author). 
 143.  See, e.g., Law Professors Back Local, supra note 75; Finamore, supra note 31; Leigh Jones, 
Law Schools’ Annual Meeting Site Draws Protests – Again, NAT’L L.J. (December 7, 2010), 
<http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202475870997>; Denise M. Champagne, Law 
Professors Are Worked Up over San Francisco Labor Dispute, DAILY RECORD (Rochester, N.Y.) (Dec. 
20, 2010), <http://nydailyrecord.com/blog/2010/12/20/worked-up-over-labor-disputes/>. 
 144.  Michael A. Fletcher, Latest Protest in Wis. Draws Thousands, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2011, at 
A4; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Timothy Williams, Rallies for Labor, in Wisconsin and Beyond, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011, at A4. In a stunning show of solidarity, Democratic state senators fled the state to 
stymie efforts to bring the controversial bill to a vote before the State Assembly. Fletcher, supra at A4. 
 145.  See Hundreds Arrested in Occupy Protests, WASH. POST. Oct. 17, 2011, at A3; see generally 
OCCUPYWALLSTREET, <http://occupywallst.org/> (last visited Dec. 9, 2011) (“Occupy Wall Street is 
[a] leaderless resistance movement . . . . The one thing we all have in common is that We Are the 99% 
that will no longer tolerate the greed and corruption of the 1%.”). 
 146.  See Monica Davey, In Wisconsin, a Big Recall Push Comes Up Short, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 
2011, at A15. 
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ing,
147
 while in Ohio, voters by referendum overturned a similar law re-
stricting collective bargaining rights of public workers in that state.
148
 As 
this Symposium goes to press, protests spawned by the Occupy Wall Street 
movement continue  the “successful production of tumult.”149 The move-
ment has entered the discourse of the 2012 presidential race,
150
 and spurred 
both interest in unions and, in some cases, collaboration between protesters 
and organized labor.
151
  It remains to be seen what types of legal action and 
political reform might come of those highly visible and deeply inspired acts 
of social protest. Successful movements, in other words, may not require an 
ongoing conflagration, so much as a periodic spark. As the AALS cam-
paign demonstrates, those moments are indeed attainable. 
                                                          
 147.  See Scott Bauer, Second Federal Lawsuit Filed over Collective Bargaining Law, 
WISLAWJOURNAL.COM (July 07, 2011, 10:09 AM) <http://wislawjournal.com/2011/07/07/second-
federal-lawsuit-filed-over-collective-bargaining-law/>. An earlier challenge in the state courts failed. 
See State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. 2011). 
 148.  See Sabrina Tavernise, Ohio Overturns A Law Limiting Unions’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2011, at A1. 
 149.  Duff, supra note 99, at 526; see also Estlund, supra  note 95 at 513 (“[F]or workers to get la-
bor law reform that favors unions, they are going to have to make some trouble.”). 
 150.  See Peter Wallsten, Obama Looks to Harness Anti-Wall St. Angst, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 
2011, at A1. 
 151.  See Melanie Trottman, Unions Look to Protesters for Future Supporters, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 
2011, at A2; Greg Sargent, What if Working Class Americans Actually Like Occupy Wall Street? 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2011, 2:23 PM) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/what-if-
working-class-americans-actually-like-occupy-wall-street/2011/10/17/gIQAniVzrL_blog.html> (report-
ing that Working America has experienced an upsurge in recruits as a result of the movement). 
 
